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"when I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd to me a new 
Scene of Thought" (David Hume to Dr George Cheyne, March/April i734) 
to Sam and Holly: "Fare forward, travellers!" 
• • 
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Introduction 
I 
Putting the matter bri~fly, and therefore, over-crudely, 
what I want to say is this: what we can ascribe to human nature 
does not determine what we can and cannot make sense o.fJ 
rather, what we can and what we cannot make sense of 
determines what we can ascribe to human nature. 
PETEH WINCH, Ethics and Action 
What would we mean if we suggested that Frankenstein is a more realistic 
novel than Tom]ones? It is an unorthodox proposal: the former involves imagi-
nary events beyond the reach of modern science; the latter involves imaginary 
events that could have taken place in practically any eighteenth-century house, 
road, or inn. By the standard of probability and plausibility, therefore, Fielding's 
novel would surely retain its long-held place as a monument to realism, just as 
Shelley's would its position as a monument to fantasy. 
If anything meaningfol can be extracted from the suggestion, it will involve 
changing ideas and implications of realism between i749 and i818, and there-
fore some discussion of the Homan tic movement will play a role. George Levine 
has suggested that "realism got its second full start in the English novel (after 
Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding) in the work of Jane Austen, and in the histori-
cal context of Romantic transformations of experience that reveal the world in 
a grain of sand," and he associated Frankenstein with this second full start 
because it enshrined the "monstrous, unnameable possibilities" of fantasy that 
always lurk offstage, "on the fringes of the most confident realism." He is right, 
surely. Just as eve1y work of fantasy must have its basis in human experience, 
or be incomprehensible, so every work of realism must involve the imaginative 
or intellectual distortion of human experience, or it will be nothing but experi-
ence, documented and communicated without shape or meaning. But realism 
has an interest in disguising such distortions, in the name of verisimilitude. 
"Whatever else it means," therefore, realism 
always implies an attempt to use language to get beyond language, to dis-
cover some non-verbal truth out there. The history of English realism 
obviously depended in large measure on changing notions of what is "out 
© KONINKL!JKg BRILL NV, I.EIDEN, 2016 I DOI 10. 1163 / 978 90043 0 8 176_002 
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there," of how best to "represent" it, and of whether, after all, representa-
tion is possible or the "out there" knowable.1 
To accept the idea that Frankenstein is a more realist novel than Tomjones 
would require a substantial change in our understanding of what is and has 
been "out there" from Fielding's time to Mary Shelley's and to our own; and 
it is that change in understanding that this study seeks to argue for and to 
substantiate. In doing so it hopes to add some illustrative detail to Levine's 
allusion to "Romantic transformations of experience." It is a central argu-
ment here that the Romantic movement conferred a different kind of real-
ism on English literature: something that demonstrates, generally speaking, 
a different set of concerns and a different sense of what is "out there" in 
human experience to that which we find in Fielding and other writers of his 
era; something that is concerned with phenomena beyond the probable and 
the plausible, and more actively bent on discovering meaning in a fuller 
human context. I call this "a new scene of thought," furthermore: the issues 
are larger than the history of prose fiction and the representation of the 
world we find there. 
Before going further with those two novels, or the aesthetic and intellectual 
contexts from which they sprang, 1 want to introduce two works of non-fiction 
that might provide a point of departure where the relation of plausibility and 
realism are concerned in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most influential 
discussion in The Stones of Venice was the sixth chapter of the second volume: 
"The Nature of Gothic." Confidently as usual, Ruskin made an immense dis-
tinction in that chapter among "the ranks of men," between the Purists (who 
"take the good and leave the evil"), the Naturalists (who "render all that they 
see in nature unhesitatingly"), and the Sensualists (who "perceive and imitate 
evil only"). The sensualists were of no interest to Ruskin, as they had nothing 
good to offer the world: but the other two groups (whose attitudes to human 
nature could take any form, imaginative or discursive, litermy or artistic, 
though in the third volume of Modern Painters Ruskin would identify purist art 
with Fra Angelico and naturalist art with Tintoretto, and in Ariadne Florentina 
he would compare Botticelli and Holbein in similar terms) present an issue of 
moral discrimination. Is it better to concentrate on the good in humanity alone 
(at the risk of being pious or idealistic), or to recognize its co-existence with 
the bad (at the risk of being equivocal or lugubrious)? 
l George Levine, The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady Chatterley 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, t981), 35, 38, 6. 
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The purist, Ruskin argued, "effaces from the countenance the traces of all 
transitory passion, illumines it with holy hope and love, and seals it with the 
serenity of holy peace": 
he conceals the forms of the body by the deep-folded garment, or else 
represents them under severely chastened types, and would rather paint 
them emaciated by the fast, or pale from the torture, than strengthened 
by exertion, or flushed by emotion. But the great Naturalist takes the 
human being in its wholeness, in its mortal as well as its spiritual strength. 
Capable of sounding and sympathising with the whole range of its pas-
sions, he brings one majestic harmony out of them all; he represents it 
fearlessly in all its acts and thoughts, in its haste, its anger, its sensuality, 
and its pride, as well as in its fortitude or faith, but makes it noble in them 
all; he casts aside the veil from the body, and beholds the mysteries of its 
form like an angel looking down on an inferior creature: there is nothing 
which he is reluctant to behold, nothing that he is ashamed to confess; 
with all that lives, triumphing, falling, or suffering, he claims kindred, 
either in majesty or in mercy, yet standing, in a sort, afar off: unmoved 
even in the deepness of his sympathy; for the spirit within him is too 
thoughtful to be grieved, too brave to be appalled, and too pure to be 
polluted.2 
Most books that live, live in spite of the au th or laying it on thick, as D.H. Lawrence 
said; and we would probably not share Ruskin's characteristic form of audacity 
nowadays. I am not sure that Fielding typically dealt with "holy hope and love," 
any more than I am sure that Mary Shelley typically looked down on humanity 
as "an inferior creature." But I think it is true that Frankenstein might strike us as 
being a more courageous book than Tomjones, and courageous in something like 
the "naturalist" spirit Ruskin described, being the work of a person (a nineteen-
year-old, indeed) "too thoughtful to be grieved, too brave to be appalled, and 
too pure to be polluted" by the moral forces and elements she was dramatizing 
even as she unveiled them. There truly is nothing that Mary Shelley is reluctant 
to behold, nothing that she is ashamed to confess; I am not sure that that is true 
of the more morally conventional Fielding. "Transitory passion"-haste, anger, 
sensuality, and pride-is very much a psychological matrix of what happens in 
Frankenstein, and it is married up to a moral vision of personality that is at 
some remove from Fielding's relatively placid arena of agency, punishment, 
2 John Huskin, W01*s, eds E.T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols (London: George 
Allen, i903-12), x. 224, 226- 7. 
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and reward. Shelley's novel might strike us, in comparison with Tomjones, as 
more serious, more profound, more telling, and above all more unsettling in its 
attitude to human problems and the elusiveness of their solutions. Frankenstein 
concerns itself in a peculiarly unremitting way with scientific ethics, the rights 
of children, the obligations of parents, individuals' needs for both companion-
ship and love, the place of "nature and nurture" in justice, and other issues 
besides. But it also concerns itself with those issues in a fundamentally inter-
related way. Each one of these dilemmas is bound up with the others-so that 
the scientist steps outside the realm of the ethically acceptable at the very time 
that he isolates himself from human company, for example; and the monster 
experiences the need for love as a direct result of seeing others experiencing its 
effects. (Thus we can never tell whether the monster killed Victor's younger 
brother out of murderous spite, for which he is morally culpable, or acciden-
tally out of a total ignorance of his ability to take the life of another. So we can 
never tell whether he is good or bad, the product of nature or nurture, a crimi-
nal or an innocent.) Tomjones is a colossal and wonderful artefact (demonstrably 
written by someone with just as much experience of the world as Mary Shelley), 
but by comparison with Frankenstein it presents (to our post-Romantic eyes at 
least) less in the way of what Erich Auerbach called, in discussing Fielding's 
novel, "problematic or existential seriousness"3-and some form or other of 
"existential seriousness" is profoundly implicated with what realism came to 
mean for Romantic writers like Mary Shelley- by no means all of whom were 
novelists; quite the reverse-and has come to mean for us. That is so because 
Romantic writers greatly augmented what the word implies in its relations to 
human experience, and the opportunities and challenges it accordingly pres-
ents in literature. 
We should hardly associate Fielding with Fra Angelico, or regard him as a 
"purist." But Huskin's definition is not so far off the point as it might appear. 
Does Fielding take all the good and leave the evil in humanity? Assuredly not: 
but he does tend both to divide such moral qualities (between Tom and Blifil, 
for example) in ways that we might regard as inherently fabulistic; and to 
supervise them (by means of Thwack um and Square, for example) in ways that, 
we might feel, are intellectually telescopic. And he is less interested in "transi-
t01y passion" than in fundamental predispositions to good and evil: predisposi-
tions that may be obscured temporarily, but which can never be uprooted. Like 
one of Rebecca West's "Pelagians" (from The Court and the Castle), he believes 
"that to be happy one has only to be good." Finally, and therefore, Fielding 
is neither as mortified nor as fascinated by evil as Ma1y Shelley proved to be. 
3 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard 
R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 492. 
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Like the eighteenth-century writers whose views are surveyed in Chapters One 
and Two, he seems to have felt that, taken in the mass, virtue will triumph over 
vice, not even for strictly religious reasons-though doubtless they could be 
added to the account provided, and should be in the eyes of writers like Samuel 
Johnson-but simply because virtue comes more naturally, indeed more eas-
ily, to humanity. Again, "severely chastened" is hardly the language we should 
use of Fielding's protagonists or his attitude towards them; but "types" Tom 
Jones and Sophia, and Joseph Andrews and Fanny are, in important respects, 
as natively and innately good human beings, whose individual "forms" are of 
secondary importance to their representative status, and whose simplicity and 
modesty will always be rewarded by fortune in the encl. So the extent to which 
a novel like Tomjones "claims kindred" with moral diversity or ambivalence, as 
we have come to understand such things, is relatively limited. Fielding's books 
are very appealing, and very beautiful; they involve sources of pleasure and 
interest that are his alone; but by comparison with Frankenstein and its darkly 
resolute exposure of the human "problematic," they are parables-and so it is 
that grief and courage are values we hardly associate with Fielding or his 
protagonists. 
I need to make it clear: Clarissa and La nouvelle Heloise were very real expe-
riences for their eighteenth-century readers, just as Troilus and Criseyde was 
for Chaucer's audience, and Troilus and Cressida was for Shakespeare's. And 
notions of "the real," existentially speaking, were debated in the eighteenth 
century, too, as the cases of Pamela and Shamela demonstrate. Readers and 
playgoers must always have related the literary material they encountered with 
what they felt to be true about their own lives-that is what responding to lit-
erature mostly is. But the "new scene of thought" from which I draw four sig-
nificant examples in the chapters below imposed or exposed a set of attitudes 
to art and life that are only rarely anticipated in the previous era, and that are 
still largely our own. 
If Frankenstein stands alongside the novels of]ane Austen in English realism's 
"second full start" at the beginning of the nineteenth century, one of the novel's 
great practitioners, working a century or so later, might also help us see what 
that second start brought with it. This is Thomas Mann's commentary on purists 
and naturalists, seen not in the universal terms that Ruskin employed, but in 
those of the two hundred years of history leading up to the time of writing: 
"Honest but gloomy," Nietzsche called the nineteenth century in contrast 
to the eighteenth, which he found, as Carlyle had, feminine and deceitful. 
But the eighteenth century did have in its human sociability a spirit in 
the service qf desirability [ wilnschbarkeit] that the nineteenth century did 
not know. More bestial and ugly, yes, more vulgar, and precisely for this 
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reason, "better," "more honest," than the former, the nineteenth century 
was truer, more subse111ient to reality of every kind. To be sure it was, in the 
process, weak in will, sad and darkly covetous, fatalistic. Neither for "rea-
son" nor for the "heart" did it show awe and respect, and through 
Schopenhauer it even reduced morality to an instinct, namely pity. As the 
scientific century that was unpretentious in its wishes, it freed itself from 
the domination of ideals and instinctively sought everywhere for theories 
to justify a fatalistic submission to the factual. The eighteenth century 
sought to forget what one knew of the nature of the human being in order 
to adapt him to its utopia. Superficial, soft, humane, enthusiastic for the 
"human being," it advocated, with the use of art, reforms of a social and 
political nature. On the other hand, Hegel, with his fatalistic way of think-
ing, his belief in the greater reason of the victorious, signified quite essen-
tially a victory over sentimentality. 
"I see," Mann concluded, "that this often varying tendency and basic disposi-
tion of the nineteenth century, its truthful, blunt, and unfeeling submission to 
the real and factual, which is averse to the cult of beautiful feelings, is the deci-
sive inheritance that I have received from it."4 
Again: R~flections of a Nonpolitical Man is a pre-war polemic, and quintes-
sentially a product of the German Romantic tradition struggling against its 
"French," "West-European," "rationalist" opponent in the lead-up to 1914. So 
Mann's is hardly neutral testimony, any more than is Ruskin's. Both men were 
products of what they sought to describe. But Mann's discussion is not very far 
removed from George Levine's. Realism, Levine remarked, can "be defined as a 
self-conscious effort, usually in the name of some moral enterprise of truth tell-
ing and extending the limits of human sympathy, to make literature appear to be 
describing directly not some other language but reality itself (whatever that 
may be taken to be)." "This way of imagining the world," forthermore, "makes 
realism a grumpy suspicion of ideas, a hard-nosed facing of facts and of the 
power of the external world over dream, desire, idea."5 It is exactly because 
Levine's expressions-"grumpy suspicion," "hard-nosed facing of facts," and 
"power of the external world"-are so drenched with the morally evaluative 
that I am interested in them: they recapitulate that "truthful, blunt, and unfeel-
ing submission to the real" that Mann describes, and that clearly constitutes 
4 Thomas Mann, Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, trans. Walter D. Morris (New York: Ungar, 
i983), 11, i2. Nietzsche's remark about the nineteenth century-"redliche1; aber diister"-is 
made in The Will to Power, §g5: "The Three Centuries." 
5 Levine, The Realistic Imagination, 8; italics added. 
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some sort of moral enterprise, touchstone, and desideratum as much as an 
artistic-cum-intellectual one. And the stress Mann and Levine lay on some-
thing truthful, blunt, and unfeeling, something fatalistic and darkly covetous, 
suggests that nineteenth-century, "Homantic," realism is something much 
more than a mere extension of the realistic (perhaps novelistic) enterprise into 
previously unconsidered elements of human sympathy. It is fundamentally 
anti-idealistic, as words like "grumpy," "hard-nosed," and "blunt" vividly sug-
gest. In a footnote to the third volume of Modern Painters ("Of Many Things") 
Huskin described the Pre-Raphaelite movement as a "stern naturalist" one, and 
nearby he spoke of the "equal and unoffenclecl vision" of naturalist art and of 
its capacity to "venture into all kinds of what, to the pseudo-idealists, are 'vul-
garities."' "Nay," he went on, "venturing is the wrong word"; "the great men have 
no choice in the matter; they do not know or care whether the things they 
describe are vulgarities or not. They saw them; they are the facts of the case. If 
they had merely composed what they describe, they would have had it at their 
will to refuse this circumstance or add that. But they did not compose it. It 
came to them ready fashioned ... "6 
I am not asking the reader to accept or underwrite Ruskin's and Mann's 
statements and characterizations-not at all. I only suggest that if we were to 
entertain the notion that Frankenstein is a more realistic novel than Tomjones, 
moral attitudes-what Auerbach calls "existential seriousness"-as well as (or 
rather than) aesthetic ones are likely to be involved in the undertaking, and 
probably have to be taken account of even in our way of posing and framing 
that discussion. The moral enterprise of literature, we have come to feel 
(I think) as a result of our Romantic inheritance, is concerned with extending 
the limits of human sympathy, no doubt, and that is concerned with our chang-
ing moral notions of what is "out there" for art to represent-"out there" being 
inside us, in the final analysis. (The bestial and the ugly being high on the list, 
as Frankenstein demonstrates.) In extending those limits we have come to find 
the brand of moral-psychological realism associated with Fielding's work to be 
insufficient for us. But Blake said: "as a man is, so he sees." We cannot separate 
our understanding of what is "out there" from our sense of ourselves as per-
ceiving subjects, and Romantic transformations of experience that reveal the 
world in a grain of sand clearly constitute a shift in viewpoint as well as percep-
tion. So "realism" is a moral position, not simply a cognitive or aesthetic one. 
Tomjones may be a closer approximation to the world as it once was, in history, 
time, and space; but Frankenstein is a closer approximation to the world as it is 
to us, in our present-day comprehension of humanity. The job of poetry, as 
6 Huskin, Works, v. 109, i17, 115. 
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Wordsworth maintained, is "to treat of things not as they are, but as they 
appear; not as they exist in themselves, but as they seem to the senses, and to 
the passions,"7 and in so far as Frankenstein summons up a profounder sense of 
human passion (the desire for fame in the scientist, the desire for justice in his 
creation, the helpless but hopeless connection between monster and man, 
"father" and "son"), it will be a more challenging-and in that sense more 
real-experience even than novels which obey the way the world exists in 
itself: in its quotidian presence. 
Realism, George Levine remarks, is a "dangerously multivalent" word, but an 
"inescapable one"-"a hot potato of a concept," as Simon Haines puts it: 
In ethics it is the name for the Aristotelian view that moral "facts" really 
exist: traits of character, aspects of human nature or function, features of 
how we do live as human beings. In epistemology, it is the name for a 
Platonist view that there are real objects behind the appearances and 
words of the world ... In aesthetics ... realism is the view that art should or 
can show social or physical phenomena as the most detailed and exact 
observation finds them, not as we commonly, superficially or imprecisely 
see them .. . 8 
What I want to propose in the pages that follow is that whereas "ethical" realism 
can coincide with "aesthetic" realism it does not have to, and that whereas both 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English literature demonstrate the pres-
ence of aesthetic realism ("social or physical phenomena as the most detailed 
and exact observation finds them"), ethical realism-an "equal and unoffended 
vision," looking through appearances to the moral relationships and realities 
that underlie them, as seen by what Wordsworth calls "the passions"-is a 
particular feature of Romantic literature precisely because Romantic writers 
like Mmy Shelley gravitated beyond the moral-psychological realm Fielding 
represents so majestically, into a realm of problematic and existential serious-
ness in which "traits of character, aspects of human nature or function, features 
7 W.J.B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser (eels.), The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, 
3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, i974), iii. 63. Ruskin would make a similar point in 
The Stones of Venice, iii. 2 ("Homan Renaissance"): "Science deals exclusively with things as 
they are in themselves; and art exclusively with things as they affect the human sense and the 
human soul. Her work is to portray the appearances of things, and to deepen the natural 
impressions which they produce upon living creatures." (Works, xi. 47- 8.) 
8 Levine, The Realistic Imagination, 6, and Simon Haines, Poetry and Philosophy from Homer to 
Rousseau.: Romantic Souls, Realist lives (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 176. 
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of how we do live as human beings" were seen in a very different light than 
they had been by many eighteenth-century writers, creative and otherwise.9 
Different ideas of the universal and the individual clearly affect this change: in 
Fielding, Tom Jones feels things because we all do (what we can ascribe to 
human nature in effect determines what we can make sense of); in Shelley and 
other Romantic realists, the starting point is different: because I feel this, oth-
ers must, too (what we can make sense of in effect determines what we can 
ascribe to human nature). 
"Honest but gloomy," Nietzsche said. The transition from Fielding's world-
view to Mary Shelley's is surely in large part a transition from optimism (even 
the angry optimism of Voltaire and Pope) to pessimism (even the glorious pes-
simism of Shelley's "Triumph of Life" or the tolerant pessimism of Byron's Don 
Juan): a pessimism that led ultimately tojude the Obscure, The Secret Agent, and 
The Buddenbrooks itselt: Nietzsche was being hyperbolic: honesty is not always 
productive of gloom; the truth is a value in itself; expressing it therefore brings 
satisfaction, even, at times, elation and excitement.10 Still, though the reaction 
Mann describes took many different forms, some degree of pessimism-stern, 
fatalistic, "darkly covetous," "grnmpy," "hard-nosed," or "blunt" as the case may be-
frequen tly accompanied it. One of the reasons, surely, that eighteenth-century 
9 Romantic realism might well be seen as something renovated rather than something discov-
ered. Chaucer and Shakespeare, too, are more "Naturalist" than "Purist," more Tintoretto than 
Fra Angelico, more Holbein than Botticelli; and the Romantic movement, of course, took 
to Shakespeare in a profound way. Just as Pride and Prejudice is built on Much Ado About 
Nothing, so Frankenstein is in many ways a reprise of The Tempest ("This thing of darkness 
I acknowledge mine"). Hestoration and Augustan culture admired Shakespeare, naturally: 
but they also had certain problems with him, as Dryden's version of Antony and Cleopatra 
or Samuel Johnson's puzzled response to King Lear demonstrate-the problems, I would 
suggest, of a purist making sense of a naturalist. Earlier, I quoted Ruskin on the "stern 
naturalism" of the Pre-Haphaelite Brotherhood, and the "equal and unoffended vision" of 
naturalist art. Elsewhere in Modern Painters ("Of Mountain Beauty") he writes that the 
Sun and Shakespeare "were both of them to shine on the evil and good; both to behold 
unoffencleclly all that was upon the earth, to burn unappallecl upon the spears of kings, 
and undisdaining upon the reeds of the river," and that Shakespeare's "stern view of 
humanity" was in this respect similar to "the ancients" (Works, vi. 441, 452). 
i o See, for example, Jane Welsh Carlyle writing to her husband on 24 July i843: "I have got 
for reading Fielding's Amelia! and the Vicar of M1k<efield- which I am carrying on 
simultaneously- I find the first a dreadful bore-one prays to Heaven that the poor woman 
would but once for all get herself seduced, and so let us have done with her alarms and pre-
cautions; on any terms! 'Upon my honour' I do not see the slightest sense in spending one's 
whole existence thro out three volumes in taking care of one's honour!-do you?" (Newly 
Selected Letters, eel. Kenneth]. Fielding and David R. Sorenson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 93.) 
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literature still appeals to us as profoundly as it does is its fundamental self-
confidence, which is so hard to put into words. "Especially his own," Auerbach 
remarked of Voltaire, "is his tempo. His rapid, keen summa1y of the develop-
ment [in this case, religious nonconformity on the London stock exchange], his 
quick shifting of scenes, his surprisingly sudden confronting of things which are 
not usually seen together-in all this he comes close to being unique and 
incomparable; and it is in this tempo that a good part of his wit lies."11 The 
qualities Auerbach finds in Voltaire (rapidity, keenness, dexterity, capacity 
for assimilation, tempo) are surely just those we respond to in Pope, so that at 
his best-in the Epistles to Several Persons, for example, or the Imitations of 
Horace-he is the most exciting poet in the language, with a sparkling intel-
lectual energy no nineteenth-century poet (not even Byron or Browning) can 
match. Even in the fourth book of The Dunciad there is an intellectual and 
moral optimism that is inextinguishable: to encompass these elements in 
humanity is to master them, to some extent. We do not always want to "submit 
to the factual," as Mann put it, and we will always read Tomjones as well as The 
Buddenbrooks, accordingly. 
In Book Five of The Excursion Wordsworth's Pastor discusses human nature 
and our limited means of access to an understanding of it: 
Knowledge, for us, is difficult to gain-
Is difficult to gain and hard to keep-
As Virtue's self; like Virtue is beset 
With snares; tried, tempted, subject to decay. 
Love, admiration, fear, desire, and hate, 
Blind were we without these; through these alone 
Are capable to notice or discern 
Or to record; we judge, but cannot be 
Indifferent judges. 'Spite of proudest boast 
Reason, best Reason, is to imperfect Man 
An effort only, and a noble aim; 
A crown, an attribute of sovereign power, 
Still to be courted-never to be won! 
-Look forth, or each man dive into himself, 
What sees he but a Creature too perturbed, 
That is transported to excess; that yearns, 
Regrets, or trembles, wrongly, or too much; 
Hopes rashly, in disgust as rash recoils; 
Battens on spleen, or moulders in despair. 
i 1 Auerbach, Mimesis, 405. 
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Thus truth is missed and comprehension fails; 
And darkness and delusion round our path 
Spread, from disease, whose subtile injury lurks 
Within the very faculty of sight.12 
11 
This is a complicated position within an ongoing intellectual drama, and some 
of it is reminiscent of a disillusioned Augustan like Samueljohnson. But there 
is a difference between discovering that certain human ideals are unachiev-
able, and discovering that they are to some extent unrealistic (an effort only, or 
a noble aim). Furthermore, I thinkjohnson would have had a genuine philo-
sophical problem with someone who believed that "love, admiration, fear, 
desire, and hate" constituted a mode of vision rather than a set of obstacles to 
it; or who suggested that each individual ultimately must "dive into himself"' to 
find the essence of human understanding; or who felt that "the ve1y faculty of 
sight" in humanity was diseased at the root. The Pastor's is not a speech about 
disillusionment with Enlightenment standards ("Reason, best Reason"), but 
about the repudiation of them, however reluctant and regretful. If you decide 
that "love, admiration, fear, desire, and hate" are your only means of discern-
ment, furthermore, that is going to condition what you see. 
It follows that the Romantic realism defined in the chapters to follow-
ethical rather than aesthetic, moral rather than descriptive, looking through 
the externals of the world to the human relations underlying them, responded 
to by the passions-is by no means confined to one department of English 
literature. The novel builds on such understandings in a particularly deep way 
in the aftermath ofJane Austen's (and Mary Shelley's) achievement, as George 
Levine shows, but this honest but gloomy, existentially serious, realism is a fea-
ture of English Romantic poetry, too, practically across the board, whether the 
poets are of the first or second generation. This book is not a survey of fiction, 
and only one of its studies involves a novelist. Wordsworth, Austen, Byron, and 
Hazlitt are the main topics of discussion in this set of studies, but they are not 
the only Romantic writers infected with the ethically realist bacillus. Blake's 
equal and unoffended realization that humans lie down with the tiger as well 
as the lamb (so that one portion of being is the prolific and the other the 
devouring, as he put it in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell), and that our native 
innocence is all too readily obscured by a scepticism of our own devising that 
we like to call "experience" are two such cases in him. Another is Keats's honest 
but gloomy disenchantment with urns, nightingales, and other portals open-
ing on to a world where truth and beauty were the same, or his recognition in 
12 William Wordsworth, The Excursion, ed. Sally Bushell, James A. Butler, and Michael 
C. jaye (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), v. 492-513. 
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The Eve of St Agnes that when lovers commit themselves to a more intense kind 
of life they are also committing themselves to its ultimate extinction. 
(Eve1ybocly, after all, however vivacious, is dead at the encl of that poem, the 
events of which took place "ages long ago.") Another is Coleridge's stern view, 
where nature is concerned, that "we receive but what we give," or his bicameral 
vision of the mind in "Kub la Khan": "a miracle of rare device,/ A sunny pleasure-
dome with caves of ice," where the arts of war always attend the arts of peace. 
Percy Shelley has a reputation for the idealist and the ethereal, but he, too, can 
be hard-nosed when it comes to facing certain facts, especially historical ones. 
"Ozymandias" presents a quintessentially ethically realist acknowledgment 
that if the ability of artists to capture and display the "sneer of cold command" 
on the faces of dictators like Ramses II is eternal, so is the sneer they are called 
upon to depict. Like poverty, tyranny is always with us; sadly, realistically, so is 
professional complicity with it. In a similar way his "Evening: Ponte al Mare, 
Pisa" recognizes that cities as old and deathly as this one have themselves seen 
out and withstood the ideas and ideals entertained by countless generations of 
living, questing, impatient individuals like the poet. Escape to the East as many 
times as you like, the poem in effect says: Pisa will be here waiting for you when 
you get back. "The poet1y of Romanticism is everywhere marked," Jerome 
McGann suggests, "by extreme forms of displacement and poetic conceptual-
ization whereby the actual human issues with which the poetry is concerned 
are resituated in a variety of idealized localities."13 I am not so sure about that: 
but even when human issues are resituated in a variety of idealized localities 
by Romantic writers, they are not necessarily made less real as a result. 
II 
So this book is both simple and traditional in its aspirations. It seeks to shed 
light on specifically Romantic habits of thought and representation-or on 
mental structures and manifestations that perhaps precede or post-date 
"thought." It does so by exploring a contrast between eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century forms of moral psychology, as dramatized, discussed, and 
propounded in a range of eighteenth-century writers (philosophical as well as 
literary, writers of poetry and criticism as well as fiction) and in depth in a far 
smaller group of Romantic ones: William Wordsworth, Jane Austen, Lord 
Byron, and William Hazlitt. It is a study of artistic and intellectual traditions, 
13 Jerome McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983), i. 
INTHODUCTION 13 
therefore. A tradition can never involve a group of people who all feel the 
same: that would be a stagnant consensus. Nor can a tradition involve a group 
of people who all feel differently: that would be an intellectual chaos. Traditions 
are made up of evolving patterns of intellectual and artistic overlap, indebted-
ness, difference, and oppugnancy. Even more than art and literature, philoso-
phy draws its vitality from disagreement and dialectic; but it also depends on 
certain intellectual continuities, or there would be nothing to disagree about-
as the career o(Deconstruction proves. Answers to questions diffe1~ but the 
questions themselves recur even as they are re-drafted. 
For example: there were, Isabel Rivers argues, two "crucial shifts," intellectu-
ally speaking, from the mid-seventeenth to the late-eighteenth centuries in 
England. "The first," she contends, "is an emphasis in Anglican thought on the 
capacity of human reason and free will to co-operate with divine grace in order 
to achieve the holy and happy life." "The second is the attempt to divorce ethics 
from religion, and to find the springs of human action not in the co-operation 
of human nature and divine grace but in the constitution of human nature 
alone." "The first," she concludes, more portentously, "comes to represent a new 
orthodoxy, and its effects in the period are very wide-reaching; the second 
shift, which in part arises from the first, remains heterodox in the period under 
consideration but its long-term influences are incalculable."14 "Increasingly 
during the seventeenth century, and certainly by Pope's time," S.L. Goldberg 
writes, 
the "self" had become a much more problematic entity than the intel-
lectual equipment of the age could readily describe or explain. Some of 
the most basic and yet intractable conflicts were clearly those within 
men and women, between their actual being and activity on the one 
hand, and their consciousness of the world and of themselves on the 
other. What was difficult to capture in the available intellectual terms was 
where and how such internal conflicts really occurred: at that point, that 
is, where simple dichotomies between subjective and objective broke 
down, where the individual's perception of reality and his or her own 
distinctive nature ... are virtually inseparable. For this is also the point 
where what people believe, what they value, and what they have the 
capacity to be and to do, are virtually inseparable from what they feel and 
desire. It is also the point where all of these various activities of the self 
14 Isabel Hive rs, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language C?f Religion and Ethics 
in England, 1660- 1780, Volume One: Whichcote to Wesley (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, i991), i. 
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shape and are shaped by the pressure of a social and political world to 
decide, to judge, to choose, and to make specific commitments.15 
No intellectual evolutions described in these terms could be monolithic. In 
fact, Rivers argues, "the range, complexity, and subtlety of the positions 
explored were much greater than is often recognized now''16-and she says 
this of the very mid-eighteenth century that saw the publication of Tomjones, 
and that is considered in the first two chapters of this book. In' The Magus of the 
North Isaiah Berlin has a noteworthy two pages on the many differences and 
between the eighteenth-century philosophes. "Yet despite these disagree-
ments," he concludes, "there were certain beliefS that were more or less com-
mon to the entire party of progress and civilisation, and this is what makes it 
proper to speak of it as a single movement."17 So I hope I can demonstrate cer-
tain currents of consanguinity, not only between philosophers as various as 
Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, and Price, but also between them 
and writers like Pope, Fielding, Johnson, Smollett, Reynolds, and Burney-
without, in the process, turning everyone concerned into what David Fate 
Norton calls "Lockean cogs in the development of Western philosophy."18 If the 
long-term influences of the eighteenth-century attempt to find the springs of 
human action in human nature alone are incalculable, as Isabel !livers sug-
gests, some approximations and economies are almost bound to result in 
attempting to calculate them, though as Isaiah Berlin demonstrates there was 
lively debate among eighteenth-century philosophers and writers, and the 
intellectual couplings and un-couplings of Romantic writers are common 
knowledge. Some eighteenth-century writers anticipated later developments, 
to a greater or lesser extent; some writers from the Romantic period (Godwin, 
for example, or Joanna Baillie) remained affiliated to earlier issues, debates, 
figures, and forms; there was no consensus at either "end" of the spectrum, and 
many intermediary figures (Burns, Cowper, and Crabbe, for example) link the 
two "scenes of thought." 
15 S.L. Goldberg, Agents and Lives: Moral Thinking in Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 191-2. 
16 Isabel Hive rs, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics 
in England, 1660-1780, Volume Two: Shaftesbwy to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000 ), 236. 
17 Isaiah Berlin, The Magus of the North:.f.G. Hamann and the Origins ofModernfrrationalism 
(London: john Murray, 1993), 26-7. 
18 David Fate Norton, "Hutcheson's Moral Healism," 398,Journal of the History of Philosophy 
23: 3 (July 1985), 397-418. 
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Wordsworth is a quintessentially Romantic poet, who in certain respects 
and under certain auspices-as we have seen-looks every inch the anti-
neoclassical rebel. "Not in entire forgetfulness,/ And not in utter nakedness,/But 
trailing clouds of glory do we come from God" is surely, amongst other things, 
a protest against Locke and his blank slates. But Locke himself had suggested 
that "God has stampt certain Characters upon Mens Minds [as children), 
which, like their Shapes, may perhaps be a little mended; but can hardly be 
totally alter'cl, and transformed into the contrary."19 In "A Poet's Epitaph" 
Wordsworth introduced a contemporary philosopher as the last word in moral 
insensibility, even idiocy: 
-A Moralist perchance appears; 
Led, Heaven knows how! to this poor sod: 
And He has neither eyes nor ears; 
Himself his world, and his own Goel; 
One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling 
Nor form nor feeling great nor small, 
A reasoning, self-sufficing thing, 
An intellectual All in All!20 
"Bald & naked reasoning's," Wordsworth wrote in his "Essay on Morals" of i798, 
"are impotent over our habits, they cannot form them; from the same cause 
they are equally powerless in regulating our judgments concerning the value 
of men & things. They contain no picture of human life; they describe nothing." 
So it is that there might be, in Wordsworth's view, "an undue value set upon 
that faculty which we call reason." 
But it is also true that in the same essay Wordsworth came up with some 
strikingly "eighteenth-century" forms of intellectual expression: that "we do 
not argue in defence of our good actions," for example, but "feel internally their 
beneficent effect."21 And the preface to Lyrical Ballads-of all publications-
which contains many expressions that once seemed completely "Romantic" in 
orientation, also reveals profoundly "eighteenth-century" intellectual ele-
ments: "our continued influxes of feelings," for example, "are modified and 
directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past 
i g john Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, eel. john W. Yolton and jean S. Yolton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), i22. 
20 William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads and Other Poems, 1797-1800, eds James Butler and 
Karen Green (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 236. 
21 Owen and Smyser, Prose Works of William Wordsworth, i. 103, 104. 
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feelings."22 This still sounds similar to much that Locke might say, and to 
the empiricist model of the mind "as an essentially bipartite entity," both site 
and agent on that site, as William Walker suggests.23 Indeed, in the "Essay, 
Supplementary" to the 1815 Poems, Wordsworth spoke of Shaftesbury-true, 
perhaps the empiricist philosopher to whom a Romantic is most likely to be 
sympathetic-as "an author at present unjustly depreciated."24 Quite rightly, 
therefore, Adam Potkay speaks of the "substantial continuities that link any 
two decades, centuries, or retrospectively imposed periods." But quite rightly, 
too, I think, he argues that in a poem like "The Discharged Soldier" Wordsworth 
"belies an eighteenth-century model of sympathy as a mechanism for percep-
tual sharing and the transmission of emotion-that is, for a more or less total 
identification with the condition and feelings of the other."25 There are sub-
stantial continuities, and there are also rejections of earlier models ("sympa-
thy" in favour of "alterity"); both are significant. 
There are differences of attitude, then. But Locke and Wordsworth share a 
parent in the British intellectual tradition as a whole. A central idea in that 
tradition-as manifest in Chaucer and Shakespeare as it is in Bacon, Hobbes, 
and the empiricist philosophers- is that the most significant experiences 
humans have are with real objects in time and space (including fellow humans), 
appreciated in the light of common sense, in the light of appearances, and 
(generally speaking) in the light of practical reason. But there are two paths 
one can follow from that point or that emphasis: that the most important thing 
about such experiences is that they provide the material for general laws about 
the world; or that the most important thing about such experiences is that they 
do no such thing and are incommensurable, incommunicable, and suigeneris. · 
(Does what we can ascribe to human nature determine what we can and can-
not make sense of, or vice versa'?) Wordsworth and Locke share an intense, 
even brooding, fascination with physical experience. It is how they interpreted 
it that is significant. Thus I would agree with Cairns Craig that we must be cir-
cumspect about seeing "in the English Romantics a leap into a new world 
22 Owen and Smyser, Prose Works of William Wordsworth, i.126. 
23 William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism, and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, i994), 48. 
24 Owen and Smyser, Prose Works of William Wordsworth, iii. 72. 
25 Adam Potkay, Wordsworth:., Ethics (Baltimore: johns Hopkins University Press, 2012 ), 9, 57. 
Potkay goes on (s8) to speak of Wordsworth "chastising'' and "stepping back" from (bogus, 
inadequate, "unrealistic") sympathy: a process we can see at work in numerous poems, 
including "We are Seven," "Simon Lee," "A Narrow Girdle of Hough Stones and Crags," 
"Beggars," "Hesolution and Independence," and so forth. The issue of sympathy versus 
alterity is returned to in Chapter Six, below, where human faces are concerned. 
INTRODUCTION 17 
beyond the presuppositions of eighteenth-century British empiricism,"26 when 
the Romantics clearly carry a good deal of baggage with them to that new 
world. But I am not sure I can follow him in saying that "British Romanticism is 
not built on the overthrow of British empiricism but on the working-out of its 
most profound consequences, those in which the imagination generates our 
only world, while, at the same time, subverting any certainty we might have as 
to its reality."27 I think the opposition is false: the working-out of consequences 
in intellectual traditions can and often does involve steep disruptions; and like 
George Levine I think that there are Romantic transformations of experience 
that eighteenth-century thought in part stimulated, but could not anticipate, 
let alone encompass. 
Certainly some Romantic writers saw the situation in that light. "I know but 
of two sorts of philosophy," Hazlitt wrote: 
that of those who believe what they feel, and endeavour to account for it, 
and that of those who only believe what they understand, and have 
already accounted for. The one is the philosophy of consciousness, the 
other that of experiment; the one may be called the intellectual, the other 
the material philosophy. The one rests chiefly on the general notions and 
conscious perceptions of mankind, and endeavours to discover what the 
mind is, by looking into the mind itself; the other denies the existence of 
every thing in the mind, of which it cannot find some rubbishy archetype, 
and visible image in its crucibles and furnaces, or in the distinct forms of 
verbal analysis. The first of these is the only philosophy that is fit for men 
of sense, the other should be left to chymists and logicians. Of this last 
kind is the philosophy of Locke ... 28 
So the nature of consciousness-the crucible of Romantic transformations of 
experience-became a vital topic for Hazlitt: "This subject," as he called it, 
the most abstruse, the most important of all others, the most filled with 
seeming inexplicable contradictions, that which bids the completest 
defiance to the matter-of-fact philosophy and can only be developed by 
26 Cairns Craig, '"Kant Has Not Answered Hume': Empiricism and the Romantic Imagination," 
41, in ed. Gavin Budge, Romantic Empiricism: Poetics and the Philosophy of Common Sense, 
1780- 1830 (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2010 ), 40- 63. 
27 Craig, "Kant Has Not Answered Hume," 6i. 
28 William Hazlitt, Complete Works, ed. P.P. Howe, 21 vols. (London: J.M. Dent, 1930-1934), 
i. 127. 
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the patient soliciting of a man's own spirit has been accordingly passed 
over by the herd of philosophers from Locke downwards.29 
The shift from neoclassic to Romantic, as Wordsworth's and Hazlitt's cases 
demonstrate, does not cancel out continuities between eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-centmy writing; but it remains an important aspect of writing 
from the Romantic era, and I hope in the discussions offered here to flesh out 
George Levine's initial comment about those blunt and hard-nosed Romantic 
transformations of experience that accompany the rebirth of realism in the 
early nineteenth century, so that we can see the pattern of affiliation and repu-
diation more clearly. 
Accordingly this study will first survey the writings of Locke, Shaftesbury, 
Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, Hume, and Richard Price. The chapter has 
no ambitions to provide a survey of eighteenth-century philosophy, or even 
of eighteenth-century British philosophy, but only to find a significant piece 
of common ground among some important figures there. (Nor does this 
set of studies seek to contribute to the history of philosophy across the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries: it seeks a shift in ethos and attitude, rather 
than an intellectual tradition.) The stress will lie on the forms of sociability, 
universalism, transparency, and sentiment such writers treated as funda-
mental to human activity, and their tendency toward the abstract in dis-
cussing such elements of moral psychology. Chapter Two traces this moral 
psychology in the work of some important eighteenth-century imaginative 
writers and critics, before contrasting aesthetic and ethical forms of realism 
in novels by Fielding, Smollett, Burney, Austen, and Mary Shelley. Though 
aesthetic and ethical forms of realism sometimes co-exist in literature they 
do not have to, and it is ethical realism that this study associates most pro-
foundly and in a most widespread way with Romanticism. There then follow 
studies ofWordsworth, Austen, Byron, and Hazlitt in terms of four ideas that 
the eighteenth-century writers whose works are considered in Chapters One 
and Two generally found problematic, but that Romantic realism fel t duty-
bound to confront, to engage with, and to exploit: the unconscious (at work 
in the two-part Prelude of i799), the irrational (at work inNorthanger Abbey), 
the immediate (at work in Donjuan), and the personal (at work in Hazlitt's 
rehabilitation of "prejudice" in general and in "My First Acquaintance with 
Poets" in particular). 
29 Hazlitt, Works, i. 70. 
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III 
Before I turn to this series of discussions, there is one more temporal perspec-
tive I should like to introduce, alongside Ruskin's and Mann's views on "natu-
ralism" and the "honest but gloomy" nineteenth century. Among the philosophers 
I have mentioned who took part in that "attempt to divorce ethics from reli-
gion, and to find the springs of human action not in the co-operation of 
human nature and divine grace but in the constitution of human nature alone," 
that Isabel Rivers described, all to some extent-whether explicitly or not-
discussed and debated the existence of a "moral sense" in humanity: an innate 
capability to judge good from evil much as taste distinguishes sweet from sour: 
"some secret Sense," as its most enthusiastic apologist, Francis Hutcheson, 
called it, "which determines our Approbation without regard to Self-Interest." 
"Men have, by Nature," Hutcheson went on, "a moral Sense of Goodness in 
Actions."30 "As if from the judge's bench/' indeed, "this reflective sense exer-
cises judgement over all that human beings do, over all the pleasures of mind 
and body, over thoughts, actions, volitions, promises, intentions, affections. It 
discerns what is good, what is proper, what is right, and what is the correct 
measure in each case."31 Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
took its departure from what he called "a controversy started of late ... concern-
ing the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON, 
or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of 
argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; 
whether, like all sound judgement of truth and falsehood, they should be the 
same to every rational intelligent human being; or whether, like the perception 
of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and 
constitution of the human species."32 
It is not my intention to enter into the "moral sense" debate from Locke to 
Hume-as to whether it is the product of nature or nurture, for example, or 
whether it can be said to exist at all, or how it conceivably could be said to oper-
ate in the social and personal spheres. That debate is beyond my expertise, which 
can only extend to a broad characterization of some British eighteenth-century 
thinkers and writers. But it is interesting to mark the fate of this expression over 
30 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty of Virtue in Two 
Treatises, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold, rev. edn (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), 92, i54. 
31 Quoted in Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the 
Enlightenment and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), i66. 
32 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morais, eel. Tom L. Beauchamp 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, i998), 73- 4. 
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time, nonetheless. Humanity without a sense of right and wrong is almost incon-
ceivable to us, except in cases of utter criminal depravity. But Hutcheson's idea 
remains as distant as the pyramids, none the less. Is there testimony we can 
introduce to register its erosion? 
As we have seen, Hazlitt had pronounced views on "the herd of philoso-
phers from Locke downwards." He could summarize the moral sense idea in 
confuting a sceptic like Helvetius,33 but he could also argue that "public bodies 
are so far worse than the individuals composing them, because the official 
takes place of the moral sense"34-a remark that sits uneasily with eighteenth-
century ideas of the social, as we shall see in Chapter One. More significantly, 
there is his discussion of Cymbeline, from The Characters qf Shakespear~'> Plays 
(1817), where he quotes Iachimo's famous examination-cum-inventory of the 
play's sleeping heroine, ending: 
... on her left breast 
A mole cinque-spotted, like the crimson drops 
I' th' bottom of a cowslip. 
"There is," Hazlitt comments, "a moral sense in the proud beauty of this last 
image, a rich surfeit of the fancy ... "35 Clearly, Hazlitt has left the realm of moral 
adjudication behind. This is an evocation and a response to it-"proud beauty ... 
rich surfeit"-that is at some remove from Hutcheson's "Goodness in Actions." 
True: there is something of approbation without self-interest in Iachimo here, 
enraptured as he is by his sleeping victim; but that rapture is driving him 
beyond the moral realm altogether, off the judge's bench, and into a realm of 
imagination. 
Talking of rich surfeits of the fancy: Thomas Carlyle, writing in 1867 about 
his rationalist-utilitarian opponents in "Shooting Niagara: and After?" derided 
their "idle habit of 'accounting for the Moral Sense,' as they phrase it": 
A most singular problem:-instead of bending every thought to have 
more and ever more of "Moral Sense," and therewith to irradiate your 
own poor soul, and all its work, into something of divineness, as the one 
thing needful for you in this world! A very futile problem that other, my 
friends; futile, idle, and far worse; leading to what Moral Ruin you little 
dream of! The Moral Sense, thank Goel, is a thing you will never "account 
33 See Hazlitt, Works, ii. 220. 
34 Hazlitt, Works, viii. 265. 
35 Hazlitt, Works, iv. i83. 
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for"; that, if you could think of it, is the perennial Miracle of Man; in all 
times, visibly connecting poor transitory Man here on this bewildered 
Earth with his Maker, who is eternal in the Heavens.36 
What Hutcheson would have made of this is hard to tell. As with Hazlitt, it car-
ries over something from the eighteenth-century idea; but as with Hazlitt, too, 
the idea has become thoroughly mystified. The moral sense can never be 
accounted for, and the attempt to do so is not only futile but misguided; it is the 
perennial miracle of man, absolutely resisting any divorce between ethics and 
religion of the kind Isabel Rivers described. 
The last three examples I have of post-Homan tic uses of the expression are 
very glancing by comparison with philosophically inclined writers like Hazlitt 
and Carlyle-though I am not sure that makes them any less symptomatic. 
After George Eliot's Mr Lyclgate is introduced to Dorothea Brooke-soon to 
become Mrs Casaubon-he reflects on the experience with typical chauvinist 
complacency: 
"She is a good creature-that fine girl-but a little too earnest," he 
thought. "It is troublesome to talk to such women. They are always want-
ing reasons, yet they are too ignorant to understand the merits of any 
question, and usually fall back on their moral sense to settle things after 
their own taste."37 
InMiddlemarch (1872) the great internal arbitrator has degenerated into a sort of 
moral-cum-intellectual nondescript, rather like "taste," and quite without rigour 
or potency-at least where the doctor is concerned. When Thomas Hardy's 
Lady Pethe1win discovers that her protegee has published what she calls "ribald 
verses" in a local paper, she is affronted in a strikingly similar fashion: 
Really, one would imagine that women wrote their books during those 
dreams in which people have no moral sense, to see how improper some, 
even virtuous, ladies become when they get into print. 
To which all that Ethelberta can reply is, "I might have done a much more 
unnatural thing than write those poems."38 In The Hand of Ethelberta 
(1876), moral sense forged ahead as a blanket term, covering consciousness 
36 Thomas Carlyle, Scottish and Other Miscellanies (London: J.M. Dent, i967), 322. 
37 George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. David Carroll (Oxford: Oxford University Press, i986), 92. 
38 Thomas Hardy, The Hand C!f Etlzefberta (London: Macmillan, i975), 97. 
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and conscience (as regards dreaming, which is the suspension of both), 
and nature and culture (as regards the probity of young women appearing 
in the Wessex Reflector); the expression hardly means anything, and cer-
tainly nothing technical, focused, or decisive of the kind Hutcheson aspired 
towards. 
Finally, Nostromo, and Colonel Sotillo's pursuit of the Gould silver through 
the persons of his captives, Captain Mitchell and Dr Monygham: 
Even in a man utterly devoid of moral sense there remains an apprecia-
tion of rascality which, being conventional, is perfectly clear. Sotillo 
thought that Dr Monygham, so different from all Europeans, was ready to 
sell his countrymen and Charles Goulet, his employer, for some share of 
the San Tome silver. Sotillo did not despise him for that. The colonel's 
want of moral sense was of a profound and innocent character. Nothing 
that served his ends could appear to him really reprehensible. Never-
theless, he despised Dr Monygham. He had for him an immense and sat-
isfactory contempt. He despised him with all his heart because he did not 
mean to let the doctor have any reward at all. He despised him, not as a 
man without faith and honour, but as a fool.39 
As with Hardy, one measure of the distance we have travelled from Hutcheson 
and Hume is the dramatic and anti-philosophical lack of clarity of the concept 
as employed here. (Thus I am not sure what Conrad means by a "conventional" 
appreciation of rascality.) But the essential point is simple ~~nough. The eigh-
teenth century recognized the likes of Sporus and Sir Balaam; it knew about 
the vanity of human wishes, and the ambivalence we feel when inspecting the 
life of Richard Savage; it could conceive of someone being guilty of his nation's 
blood. But it could not conceive of someone "utterly devoid of moral sense," or 
if it could, it did not bother to write about such an individual. Blifil and Lovelace 
are nasty bits of work, to be sure. But the one is a pasteboard villain, whose 
possession of moral sense is neither here nor there; and the other could cer-
tainly not be said to be devoid of moral sense, whatever his crimes against 
human decency. But Conrad's Sotillo, like Dickens' Mr Monks (from Oliver 
Twist), or George Eliot's Henleigh Grandcourt (from DanieLDeronda), or James' 
Gilbert Osmond (from The Portrait of a Lady), really does enter the territory of 
manifest evil, and really does exploit, consolidate, and extend a new sense of 
what is "out there" in post-Romantic moral psychology. Before we consider fur-
ther what that might be we must get a clearer sense of certain eighteenth-
century scenes of thought. 
39 Joseph Conrad, Nostro mo: A Tale of the Seaboard (London: J.M. Dent, 194 7 ), 350. 
